Introduction
Bad administration, to be sure, can destroy good policy; but good administration can never save bad policy.
-Adlai Stevenson
The United States has followed a policy of dual containment toward Iran and Iraq since May 1993. The object of dual containment is to isolate these regimes politically, economically, and militarily. The United States has been actively involved in the Middle East for the last 50 years and dual containment is a shift in policy direction. It is relevant at this time to examine the viability of dual containment within the context of the region and balanced against the current national security strategy of engagement and enlargement.
President Clinton began to set the foundations for America's current Persian Gulf policy almost immediately upon assuming office. During his first year in office, his administration issued numerous policy objectives. These aspirations culminated in the announcement of dual containment on May 18, 1993 . 1 The policy is the creation of two senior White House aids -Martin Indyk, at the time the National Security Council's Middle East Officer, and Anthony Lake, then serving as Special Assistant to the President for National Security. 2 With this announcement, the United States formally altered its foreign policy toward the two most powerful and populous Persian Gulf states -Iran and Iraq. Thus, the Clinton Administration began to isolate these states politically, economically, and militarily.
The rationale for dual containment is the direct result of three events. First, the end of the Cold War allowed the United States to pursue a more discriminate policy.
Previously, these two nations were used by the superpowers as pawns, with the Iraqi regime leaning to the Soviets, and Iran developing ties to the United States (which were severed by the Iranian Revolution in 1979). No longer, however, is America forced to balance one state against the other to achieve strategic objectives. With the demise of the Soviet Union, America became the sole remaining superpower, and now has the luxury of selectivity with respect to foreign policy strategies. A second determining factor is the political outcome of Desert Storm. Although the war was a clear military victory for the coalition forces, its political aftermath is considered a failure by many observers because Saddam Hussein remains in power. The United States, ever leery of Saddam's preoccupation with military adventurism, is resigned to the fact that American foreign policy must incorporate strategies that will cripple this despot. Additionally, the issues that initially led to this war are still unresolved and other difficulties have manifested themselves -political uncertainty, regional hostility, fear of military actions, and the specter of weapons of mass destruction. 3 The third factor is the Arab-Israeli peace process. Both Iran and Iraq have well-documented ties to subversive elements that are opposed to the peace process. In the case of Iraq, these relations are generally formed with the more radical Palestinian groups. Iran, in contrast, tends to form ties with Shiite
Islamic fundamentalists -like Hezbollah. It is the belief and desire of the Clinton Administration that the strategy of dual containment will severely cripple Iran and Iraq's ability to influence their surrogates in the Levant.
The policy of dual containment is significant in that it is focused on a region that is vital to the national security of the United States. Approximately 66 percent of the world's known oil reserves are found in the Persian Gulf and the surrounding states. Not only is oil very abundant, but it is accessible and of high quality. Iran and Iraq are considered the regional superpowers. These two nations have a combined population exceeding 85 million people. Although neither presents a serious challenge to a NATO type military, they do pose a very real threat to the surrounding Gulf states. The United
States has for the past 50 years stated that uninterrupted access to oil from the Persian
Gulf is of vital national interest. The defense of these vital interests equates to a willingness to go to war to ensure that they are not challenged. 
United States Policy in the Persian Gulf
Power is not merely shouting aloud. Power is to act positively with all the components of power.
-Gamal Abdel Nasser A sense of direction in the development of American policy leads to the current policy of dual containment. To its authors, the concept of containment is not new and the policy "incorporates a number of elements from previous American policies." 1 The authors of the policy of dual containment find it to be, "the culmination of a trend toward an increasingly direct American strategic role in the gulf." 2 
Officials in the Clinton
Administration, "have tried to justify 'dual containment' in historical terms," as a logical progression of US policy in the region. . . . we will maintain forces deployed in the region, expand our bilateral defense arrangements, preposition materiel and equipment, and conduct joint and combined exercises to defend the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of our partners in the region. We will continue to work to assure access to oil, deter recourse to war, terrorism and subversion, and enforce UN Security Council resolutions.
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President Clinton took office in a time when conducting diplomacy was increasingly complex. Clinton's first year in office was "a period of 'international deregulation,' one in which there are new players, new capabilities, and new alignments -but, as yet, no new rules." 14 Many political analysts found that President Clinton's administration began with a "sense of confusion" in defining US interests and foreign policy. 15 In spite of its confused start, the Clinton Administration defined US interests in the Middle East the same as previous administrations. In the President's national security strategy he states:
The United States has enduring interests in the Middle East, especially pursuing a comprehensive breakthrough to Middle East peace, assuring the security of Israel and our Arab friends, and maintaining the free flow of oil at reasonable prices. Our strategy is harnessed to the unique characteristics of the region and our vital interests there, as we work to extend the range of peace and stability.
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President Clinton has embarked upon a national strategy of engagement and enlargement. In this strategy, the President has stated that America is not the "world's policeman," although, as the remaining superpower, militarily and economically, the United States is obligated to create stable political relations and open trade.
By engaging nations through "preventive diplomacy" (support for democracy, economic assistance, military presence, military-to-military contacts, and multilateral negotiations) America can focus its resources "where it can make the most difference." 17 Enlargement is described by the Clinton Administration in the following terms:
Our national security strategy is based on enlarging the community of market democracies while deterring and containing a range of threats to our nation, our allies and our interests. The more that democracy and political and economic liberalization take hold in the world, particularly in countries of geostrategic importance to us, the safer our nation is likely to be and the more our people are likely to prosper. 18 The strategy of engagement and enlargement was tested in 1994 when Iraqi threats against Kuwait were answered by America's rapid deployment of forces to the threatened border. In the words of Secretary of Defense William J. Perry "in short, the Gulf in 1991 was a prime example of America's ability to fight a war, and the Gulf in 1994 was a prime example of our ability to prevent one."
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A significant part of President Clinton's strategy to safeguard US interests in the Persian Gulf is dual containment. In conjunction with dual containment, the United States "will maintain our long-standing presence which has been centered on naval vessels in and near the Persian Gulf and pre-positioned combat equipment." 20 The Clinton
Administration's primary focus in the Gulf is to "reduce the chances" that any nation will threaten the sovereignty of any of the GCC states. 21 In addition to American presence in the Gulf, the US strategy calls for helping the GCC nations maintain a collective defense.
American policy in the Gulf has gone from indirect involvement, using the region as a religious or secular, that we oppose." 22 The US policy and response is continued direct involvement in the Persian Gulf. According to the National Security Strategy, "A key objective of our policy in the Gulf is to reduce the chances that another aggressor will emerge who would threaten the independence of existing states." 23 President Clinton is taking this direct role a step further with dual containment.
America is not only directly involved in regional security, but two specific Middle East nations are the focus of US containment. The Clinton policy of dual containment can be seen as, "the culmination of a trend toward an increasingly direct American strategic role 24 Gause, "The Illogic of Dual Containment," p. 59.
Chapter 3 The Policy of Dual Containment
Never look down to test the ground before taking your next step; only he who keeps his eye fixed on the far horizon will find the right road.
-Dag Hammerskjold
The official announcement of the policy of dual containment came from a speech The backlash states share some common characteristics that run counter to American core values. Those characteristics are: control of power through coercion, suppression of human rights, promotion of radical ideologies, opposition to popular participation, inability to engage constructively with other nations (or to function well in alliances), and possession of a "siege mentality," as evidenced by seeking to obtain weapons of mass destruction. 3 Lake states that as the sole superpower the United States has a responsibility to confront the backlash states and neutralize, contain, and reform them. Since each backlash state is unique, it is necessary for US policies to be tailored to each state, with the primary focus on containment. The containment of these nations will be done in three ways: first, through isolation from the international community, second, diplomatic and economic pressures using such methods as UN sanctions or international boycotts, and third, restrictions of their military and technical capabilities. it requires the assistance of regional allies, especially the GCC nations.
Lake acknowledges that the Clinton administration has certain advantages that previous administrations did not. First, with the elimination of the Soviet Union, the Pressures on a shattered Iraqi regime could come from an internal power struggle.
More drastic consequences might be seen if the forces were external. Neighboring nations may seek to carve up Iraq. 21 Or, Iran could attempt to put a friendly regime in Baghdad and begin to exert pressure on neighboring Gulf nations. 22 According to Lake and Indyk, the policy of dual containment depends upon three larger considerations. First, prior to the end of the Cold War, the United States was forced to support one regime against another in order to maintain a balance of power in the region against Soviet aggression. With our major adversary eliminated from the region, US policy toward the Persian Gulf is able to become less restrictive and more discriminate. With both Iran and Iraq displaying openly hostile policies toward America, the United States is at liberty to institute a policy that contains both regimes, without suffering a loss of strategic advantage. Secondly, the fundamental goal of dual containment is to politically and economically isolate these regimes, in part in order to increase the chances for a lasting peace settlement between the Arabs and Israel.
Therefore, a policy that inhibits contact between these regimes and their surrogates can only expedite the peace process. Thirdly, the policy facilitates a forward deployment of US military to a region of the world that is capable of exploding at any time. Not only does American military presence decrease the chance of further war in the region, it also increases cooperation between our allies in the form of training exercises and joint operations. Also, the structure of its economy has contributed significantly to the success of containment. Iraq's main exports and imports, before sanctions were levied against it, were petroleum products and foodstuffs, respectively. The community of nations has very effectively severed both of these economic lifelines. The goal of the Clinton 
Chapter 4

Conclusions and Recommendations
It is much easier to be critical than to be correct. Maintaining a US Naval presence and reserve military stocks in the region is costly.
A large and visible US military presence in the Gulf may carry the political cost of being a destabilizing force for GCC nations (a lightening rod for discontent).
Dual containment is too passive to force a change in behavior from either regime.
Containment is a policy of inaction, which gives both regimes an inflated sense of their own power.
The second general option for the United States is to pursue a policy option of greater engagement. The following three options are variations of the engagement alternative. The advantages and disadvantages of all three policy options overlap; therefore, they will be considered together. All three options of engagement would begin slowly in engaging the target nation or nations and would be directed at expanding economic links first and political ties next. There are several major disadvantages of this option. Aggressive American action directed at either Iran or Iraq would be difficult to achieve militarily or covertly.
The potential political cost for actively supporting opposition groups or covert operations, which may become public, would be extremely risky. Dual containment has been unable to deter either Iran or Iraq from expanding their military strength. As economic conditions improve in each of these countries, their revenues will grow, which will allow them greater ability to finance their rearmament programs.
General economic relations will grow between the GCC nations, Iran, and (eventually) Iraq. With this expanded interdependence, comes a decrease in the perception of these nations as threats to the GCC. It is possible that the GCC will slow arms purchases from the United States as a result.
Diminished Iranian and Iraqi threats to Persian Gulf security will lessen the need for a large US presence in the region. The GCC nations will use this outcome as an opportunity to ease the US military our of their countries, a presence that for most Gulf monarchies is a political liability. The bottom line for the United States is the potential loss of its foothold in the region.
Based upon the debate reviewed in this paper and the possible options that exist at this time, the following recommendation is made. By engaging both Iran and Iraq, it will be simpler to monitor compliance with efforts to limit weapons of mass destruction. Guarantees for human rights would be better observed from within these nations rather than attempting to influence them through isolation.
Iran is simply too large to ignore. Because of its size and location, Iran will always be a significant player in the Persian Gulf region. The United States is much more likely to have an impact on the Iranian regime from inside than outside.
America must find some common ground with Iran. As previously suggested, that may initially be through economic contact. Iran was willing to make an oil concessions deal with CONOCO, which suggests that a desire exists in Iran to accept US businesses within their borders. If America doesn't engage Iran soon, opportunities will be lost for The Persian Gulf has grown into an area of vital interest to the United States. Iran and Iraq are physically and politically significant in the region. Whether the United States chooses to contain or to engage these two nations, it will require a high level of political energy.
The United States should seek to engage and influence the Persian Gulf region. The
Clinton Administration has stated:
Our national security strategy is based on enlarging the community of market democracies while deterring and containing a range of threats to our nation, our allies and our interests. The more that democracy and political and economic liberalization take hold in the world, particularly in countries of geostrategic importance to us, the greater our nation likely to prosper.
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A US policy, which recognizes that Iran and Iraq are less of a threat if they are engaged, will be the greatest contributor in achieving our strategic interest in the region.
Notes
